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Abstract 
Together with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) entering the port market in China, some important relationships emerge 
among three principle parts, foreign-funded enterprises, government, and the existing port enterprises. Among these three 
relationships, the relationship between the foreign-funded enterprises and government is the main basis in port FDI entry 
mode choice. The foreign-funded enterprises will consider the FDI to choose a desirable mode through either new investment 
or acquisitions, in order to achieve profit maximization. The Chinese government has the choice to make incentives or 
restrictions policies on FDI, with the objective of maximizing its social welfare. This paper applies Game Theory to analyze 
FDI entry mode by using a two-stage Game model between foreign-funded enterprises and government. In the first stage, this 
paper builds the government's utility function and the foreign-funded enterprises  Cobb-Douglas production function, 
analyzing the optimal strategy for foreign-funded enterprises and government. In the second stage, this paper analyzes the 
equity allocation of port FDI.  
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.  
Selection and/or peer-review under responsibility of Chinese Overseas Transportation Association (COTA). 
Keywords: Port; FDI; Two-stage Game Theory; Entry mode; Equity arrangement. 
1. Introduction 
Port is a bridge to connect the domestic market with the international. Nowadays, as the port investment 
changes frequently, the foreign investment plays a key role which can not be ignored in the port construction. In 
aspects of upgrading the technical concept, improving the service quality and dispersing the investment risk, the 
foreign investment plays an active role. However, introducing a large amount of foreign investment has a huge 
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impact on the domestic port companies. Multiple connections among three major parties will be created when the 
foreign investment is introduced into the port market. The connection between the foreign investing companies 
and the government is the main basis for the entry modes of FDI port. Different entry modes of FDI have 
different levels of impact on the social interest, and the government need to make right choice for the foreign 
investment policy after weighing the benefits in every aspect to realize the maximum of social welfare after 
bringing in the investment (Hu Guoheng, 2009). 
 
In general, there are three different entry modes for foreign investment entering the market in host country, 
that is ,entry for the exports, transfer of technology patent (license) and direct investment entry (Tang Xiaopeng, 
2007). In the port industry, the foreign investment get entry to the port mainly with the mode of direct investment. 
Nowadays, the entry modes for port FDI are mainly new investment and acquisitions. Achieving revenue 
maximization, foreign-funded enterprises need to consider their own resources, capability, and the investment 
environment in the host country comprehensively, to make a desirable choice for the entry mode (Tu Min, 2009). 
 
    The existing literature on game analysis between companies and government focused on the field of public 
transportation, environmental protection (Lu, Lianxing, and Guangyu, 2011) and reverse logistics, while 
exploring the entry mode of port FDI quantitatively is rather rare. This article will explore the entry modes of 
government and port FDI based on the Two-stage Game Theory. In the first stage, the foreign-funded enterprises 
will consider the FDI to choose a desirable mode through either new investment or acquisitions, in order to 
achieve profit maximization. The China government chooses to make incentives or restrictions policies on FDI. 
In the second stage, this paper analyses the equity allocation of port FDI. The findings in this paper will provide 
the reference for the choice of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) entering the port market in China and support the 
policy decision-making for the government. 
 
2. First-stage Game: the optimal strategy for foreign-funded enterprises and Chinese government  
The Government's strategy includes making incentives or restrictions policy on foreign investment. The 
behavior of foreign-funded enterprises includes new investment and acquisitions. This section will analyze the 
utility of government and foreign-funded enterprises, using the social welfare and foreign profit as the objective 
function respectively. The Game result determines the optimal strategy for foreign-funded enterprises and China 
government.  
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2.1. Game model assumption  
Regarding government and foreign-funded enterprises as the two main body of the Game, they are rational, 
that is, their goal is to maximize their interests.  
 
The game between government and foreign-funded enterprises can be seen as the benefit comparison between 
them. The economic profit resulting from new investment or acquisitions is recorded as foreign investment 
decision-making objective. The social welfare brought by government adopting the incentive or restrictions 
policy on foreign investment can be considered as government decision-making objective.  
 
Foreign investment can promote export, increase taxes, increase employment in China. As the increase of the 
scale of foreign investment, the social welfare will also increase. Making incentive policy on FDI is a kid of 
interests alienation, the greater of foreign investment scale, the greater cost the China government will pay. If 
government implements restriction policy on foreign investment, the costs is very few and can be ignored. The 
overall introduction of foreign advanced technology, comparing with acquisitions mode, the port FDI department 
productivity will be higher with new investment mode. If the Government takes out incentives policy on FDI, 
foreign capital utility will be enhanced, so the elasticity of capital will increase.  
2.2.The description of objective function  
 The description of government's utility function (Xiaoming, 2004) 
 
The social welfare is the difference between government's revenue and cost. China government revenue 
refers to the social benefits arising from the foreign policy made by government. The government's cost include 
two parts: one part is the cost spent on making policy and management fee for FDI, the other part is the extra-
consuming in attracting foreign investment and risk of failure when the government adopts incentive strategy. 
According to the principles of economics: With the increase of FDI scale, the government's returns increase, and 
increasing marginal.  
 
Therefore, the function about the relationship of government revenue w and port FDI scale q  can be expressed 
as:  
1 ( 0, )i l h lw a q a i l h a aq                                                                                           (1) 
 
In the formula (1), ha is the coefficient of the function when the government adopts incentive policy on the 
foreign investment, la  is the coefficient of the function when the government adopts restricting policy on the 
foreign investment. 
 
The cost ( 1c )spent on making policy and management is 
)1(121 qq
qc                                                                                                                                     (2) 
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In the formula (2), q denotes the port FDI scale. 
 
The extra-consuming ( 2c ) denotes the fee used attracting foreign investment and risk of failure when the 
government adopts incentive strategy is: 
 
 22 dqc                                                                                                                                                     (3)  
 
In the formula (3), d  is the relation constant between cost and port FDI scale.  
 
According to formula (1) (2) (3), if the China government adopts restrict policy on port FDI, the 
government's utility function is:  
 
2 21 1( )gxz l la q q a q qq q
                                                                                                     (4) 
 
If the China government adopts the incentive policy on port FDI, the government's utility function is: 
222 )1()1(1 qdqadq
q
q
q
qa hh
g
jl
                                                                         (5) 
 The description of the foreign-funded enterprises objective function  
 
Cobb - Douglas production function (CD function) studied the relationship between capital and labor inputs 
and outputs. Its basic form is described as: Q AK L , in this formula , Q refer to the total output value, K 
refer to the invested capital, L is the input of labor, and are respectively refer to the elasticity of capital 
coefficient and the elasticity coefficient of the labor, A is the production efficiency coefficient, reflecting the 
influence caused from some retention variables other than labor and capital in the production process.  
 
To simplify the CD function, the two elements of the production function can transform into one .The labor 
input L can converter into capital. In this way, suppose K L ,  refer to the labor capital equivalency factor. 
According to the fact that the partial derivative of the actual capital and output capital to the outputs are equal, we 
can get Q A K ; / ( )   (Lei Yong, 2001).   
 
Therefore, the foreign utility function can be expressed as:  
i i
iA q i=l h,). 1i  
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If the foreign-funded enterprises adopt new investment behavior, the production efficiency of the foreign 
utility function coefficient is Ah, if foreign-funded enterprises deal with FDI by acquisitions, the production 
efficiency is Al, and Ah>Al. Foreign-funded enterprises take the new investment behavior, part of the capital 
invested will be used for pre-adaptation and transformation of the local environment (called FDI capital loss). 
When government adopts incentives policy on foreign investment, the capital elasticity in the utility function 
is h , when the government adopts restrictions policy on foreign investment, the capital elasticity is l , and 
h l .  
2.3. The Game matrix between the foreign-funded enterprises and the government  
    According to Game model assumptions and the description of the objective functions, we can get the Game 
matrix of port FDI entry strategy between foreign-funded enterprises and government.  
 
In the condition of complete information, the game matrix between foreign-funded enterprises and 
government is shown in Table 1:  
Table 1 Game matrix of foreign-funded enterprise and government 
government, foreign utility function 
Foreign-funded enterprises strategy 
New Investment Acquisitions 
Government strategy 
Incentives policy hh qAqdqa hh ;1
2  hh qAqdqa lh ;)1(
2  
Restrictions policy ll qAqqa hl ;
2  ll qAqqa ll ;
2  
 
 Analysis of the Government's strategy  
 
The condition of government to adopt incentive policies on foreign investment is:  
g g
jl xz  
22)1( qqaqdqa lh  
 
The result is h l
a aq
d
if the port FDI scale h l
a aq
d
, The China government tends to take the 
investment incentive policy. On the contrary, the Government tends to adopt restrictions on foreign investment 
policy.   
 Analysis of the strategy of foreign-funded enterprises  
 
When the Government tends to take incentive policy on port FDI, if the foreign-funded enterprises take the 
new investment strategy, the constraint condition is: 
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f f
xj bg
hhhh qAqA lh )(  
The result is
hh lh AA
q 11
1
if the FDI scale 
hh lh AA
q 11
1
 the port 
FDI tends to enter into the market with the strategy of new investment, on the contrary, port FDI tends to enter 
with acquisitions. 
  
When the China government adopts restrictions policy on port FDI, if the foreign-funded enterprises take 
the new investment strategy, the constraint condition is: 
 
: ( )l l l lf fxj bg h lA q A q  
The result is
ll lh AA
q 11
1
, if the port FDI scale
ll lh AA
q 11
1
The Port 
FDI tends to enter with the strategy of new investment. On the contrary, port FDI tends to enter with acquisitions.  
 
3. Second-stage Game: port FDI equity allocation 
After the first stage Game between the China government and foreign-funded enterprises, the premise of the 
port FDI entry strategy is defined. Then the game will enter the second stage, the mode of port FDI equity 
allocation. In early times, there are strict requirements in the joint venture port that the stock should be controlled 
by China in China port. Since April 1, 2002, the shareholding restrictions on the construction and operation of 
port facilities is canceled, the equity allocation of the port become more flexible.  
 
The current theory on FDI equity entry mode in domestic and abroad can be divided into four categories: 
transaction cost theory, bargaining plus theory, resource theory, the theory of institutional factors (Hung, 2004; 
Lin and Jianming, 2011). The study is mainly qualitative analysis, lacking of quantitative analysis to determine 
the equity allocation. In this section, game theory will be used to find the optimal equity allocation in FDI port. 
The study result will provide a reference for FDI entry mode in other field. 
3.1. Game model assumption  
1) The total capital of the FDI port is I, the actual total available revenue is .In which foreign ownership 
equity ratio of the joint venture port is , and China holding a FDI port equity ratio (1- ). 

2) Due to the China government policy on FDI, the FDI port's equity and power of control are not consistent. 
 (The degree of openness, preferential level) refers to the level of matching the equity and the actual power of 
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control. When the policy is benefit for one party, the party will receive an additional hidden income. In the study, 
suppose >0, when the policy tend to foreign capital. 
 
3) In the FDI port, when the enterprises of China due diligence, the success probability of FDI port is 
hp .While enterprises of China pursue private benefits is , with the resources and local advantages, they take  
opportunistic behavior, and it also known as not due diligence, then the success probability of FDI port is lp . 
Foreign-funded enterprises will take supervision on the opportunistic behavior of China enterprises. The 
supervision will cost some money. The private benefit is related with equity ratio (1- ) positively, which can 
be described as )1( ,  is a constant, referring to the largest private benefits when the host has full equity). 
Monitoring cost and the proportion of foreign equity ratio are related positively, which can be described as c . 
3.2. Game model matrix 
Under the model assumption, revenue function can be drawn as follows (Chunyu, 2005): 
 
1) when the enterprises in China is due diligence,  
The China enterprises income is (1 ) [(1 ) cw]hP - -  
The Foreign-funded enterprises income is [(1 ) ]hP I cw  
2) when the enterprises in China is not due diligence, 
The China enterprises income is (1 ) [(1 ) cw- (1- )] (1 )lP - -  
The Foreign-funded enterprises income is [(1 ) (1 )]lP I cw  
 
Port FDI equity game matrix is shown in the Table 2 below, based on Game between the China enterprises 
and foreign-funded enterprises. 
 
Table 2   FDI Port equity game matrix 
Game proceeds 
Corporate behavior of the host country 
due diligence Not due diligence 
s net income (1 ) [(1 ) cw]hP - -  (1 ) [(1 ) cw- (1- )] (1 )lP - -  
Foreign-  [(1 ) ]hP I cw  [(1 ) (1 )]lP I cw  
3.3. Establishment of incentive compatibility model of FDI port 
Constraint conditions one: the benefit of China enterprises when it chooses to fulfill its duty is not less than 
when it does not choose to fulfill its duty. 
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Constraint conditions two: the benefit which is gained by foreign capital is more than the initial input and 
monitoring costs. 
 
From the first constraint condition we can get:   
cIPh )1()1(  )1()1()1()1( cIPl                        
(6) 
From the second constraint condition, we can get:  
 
 cIPh )1( )1()1( cIPl                                         
(7) 
Combine formula 6 and 7 , it is easy to get: 
c)-(
]-I-)-[(1-)1(
lh
lh
PcP
PPI
 
c)-(
]-I-)-[(1-)1(*
lh
lh
PcP
PPI
 is the optimal equity allocation game model. When the 
foreign shareholding proportion * , opportunistic behavior of China enterprises will be avoided.  
4. Numerical example  
Since the date in practice is difficult to collect, numerical example is given to explain the two-stage game 
model. Give each parameter a reasonable value respectively, then the finally result is calculated by the use of 
MATLAB. 
4.1. Assignment for parameter 
The assignment for each parameter is list in Table 3. 
Table 3 Assignment for each parameter 
parameter value parameter value parameter value 
ha  10 h  0.2 hP  0.7 
la  6 l  0.1 lP  0.3 
d 1  2 I 10 
hA  5  3  15 
lA  3  0.1  0.2 
c 1 v 2   
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4.2. The matrix of two-stage game 
Now the values of each parameter are brought into the two-stage model in the text, the result is calculated 
using MATLAB. In the first stage, the game matrix between foreign-funded enterprises and government is shown 
in Table 4. In the second stage, Port FDI equity game matrix is shown in the Table 5, based on the host 
enterprises and foreign-funded enterprises Game. 
 
Table 4 Game matrix of foreign-funded enterprise and government 
Government, foreign utility function 
Foreign-funded enterprises 
New Investment Cross-border mergers and acquisitions 
Government 
strategy 
Incentives policy 
3.02 374.5;10 qqq  3.02 45.3;210 qqq  
Restrictions policy  
2.02 336.5;6 qqq  2.02 21.3;6 qqq  
 
Table 5   Port FDI equity game matrix 
Game proceeds 
Corporate behavior of the host country 
due diligence Not due diligence 
The host country net income )2)(1(7.0  )1(2)]1(22)[1(3.0  
Foreign-funded enterprises net income 3)2(7.0  3)1(223.0  
 
4.3. The result of two-stage game 
 
From Table 4 and Table 5, we can get the result as follows. 
 In the first stage of the game 
 
In the condition of incomplete information, if the port FDI scale 4q , government tends to take the 
investment incentive policy. On the contrary, the government tends to adopt restrictions on foreign investment 
policy.  When the Government tends to take the investment incentive policies, if the amount of investment of a 
foreign-funded enterprise 2.3317q  the foreign-funded enterprises tend to take the strategy of new 
investment, on the contrary, port FDI tends to enter with acquisitions. When the Government adopt restriction 
policy on port FDI, if the port FDI scale 2.3317q the foreign-funded enterprises tend to take the strategy of 
new investment. On the contrary, port FDI tends to enter with acquisitions.  
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 In the second stage of the game  
 
Using MATLAB, the lowest foreign ownership equity ratio of the joint venture port is 1.0* when the 
foreign shareholding proportion 1.0 , opportunistic behavior of China enterprises will be avoided. 
5. Conclusions 
The paper discusses the entry mode of port FDI quantitatively. However, since the influencing factors of the 
objective function are not comprehensive, and the situation is not involved that equity and control are separate 
when analyzing the equity allocation. Moreover, the non-equity arrangement is not taken into consideration. 
Therefore, the study remains to be further in-depth. 
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